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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
lldar Dursunov appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals previously related the factual background of this 
case as follows: 
The fourteen-year-old victim in this case stated that Dursunov, who 
was twenty-one, invited her to a party where he served her alcohol and 
then had sexual intercourse with her. Dursunov was charged with, and 
pleaded guilty to, lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 
18-1508. 
Before sentencing, the district court ordered a psychosexual 
evaluation. Dursunov, whose native language is not English, was 
provided a Russian interpreter for the psychosexual examination that 
included a polygraph test. At sentencing, Dursunov told the district court 
judge that he disagreed with the characterization of some of his words at 
the psychosexual examination but made it clear that he was not 
contending the characterization of his words made the evaluation invalid. 
Dursunov was sentenced to a twenty-year term of imprisonment with six 
years determinate. 
Dursunov then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, arguing that 
his sentences were imposed in an illegal manner because the interpreter 
for his psychosexual evaluation was deficient and the polygraph was not 
performed properly. Additionally, Dursunov argued for leniency based on 
the same infonnation and the testimony of a licensed professional 
counselor, Gail Ater, that Dursunov was amenable to rehabilitation. 
(R., pp.77-78 (footnote omitted).) The district court denied Dursunov's Rule 35 motion 
(R., pp.114-25), and Dursunov appealed (R., pp.320-22). In an unpublished opinion 
filed on March 17, 2010, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Dursunov's sentence and 
the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.77-84.) 
1 
Dursunov filed a petition for post-conviction relief on February 2, 2011, alleging 
numerous instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (R., pp.4-8.) On March 
31, 2011, the district court issued its notice of intent to dismiss Dursunov's petition. (R., 
pp.334-43.) On March 30, 2011, the state also moved the court for summary dismissal. 
(R., pp.148-66.) At a hearing on summary disposition held on May 9, 2011, the district 
court reiterated its grounds for dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing and 
summarily dismissed the petition. (Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.10, L.13; R., p.366.) Dursunov 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.369-71.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Dursunov states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. 
Dursunov's post-conviction claim? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Dursunov failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Dursunov Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
The district court, adhering to the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906, 
summarily dismissed Dursunov's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.366.) 
Dursunov argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief, asserting that he made a prima facie showing of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.) Application of relevant legal 
standards to the facts alleged in Dursunov's petition, however, shows that he failed to 
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. His claims were either 
affirmatively disproved by the record or did not justify relief as a matter of law. The 
district court therefore properly dismissed Dursunov's petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Dursunov's Post-Conviction Petition 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
4 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 
P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Generally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-
conviction relief. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). 
However, unlike other civil complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must 
contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1 )." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 
1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 
626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). Instead, the application must be supported by a statement 
that "specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based." 19..c (citing 
I.C. § 19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State 
v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
A district court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when it 
"is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that 
the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief," by indicating its intention to dismiss 
and giving the parties an opportunity to respond within 20 days. I.C. § 19-4906(b). 'To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's 
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claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court 
is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 
522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). The trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to 
dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the 
petitioner to relief. ~ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do 
not justify relief as a matter of law." ~ 
Dursunov's petition alleged that his attorney was ineffective for failing to inform 
him of his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 158, 149 P.3d 833 (2006); for failing 
to obtain a confidential psychosexual evaluation prior to advising him to enter a guilty 
plea; for allowing the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation to be disclosed to the court 
without knowing its results; for failing to inform him that he could obtain his own 
confidential psychosexual evaluation; and for failing to object to Dr. Horton's 
psychosexual evaluation. (R., pp.4-7.) 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively 
deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 ldaho758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-
6 
77 (1988). To show deficient performance, the petitioner must "overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating 'that counsel's 
representation did not meet objective standards of competence."' Vick v. State, 131 
Idaho 121, 124, 952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644, 648-49, 873 P.2d 898, 902-03 (Ct. App. 1994). Appellate courts "will not 
second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Chapman, 
120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Larkin, 
102 Idaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981 ); State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 426, 
546 P.2d 380, 381 (1976)). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in 
relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this 
type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, _ 
U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 
(2000)). Application of these relevant legal standards shows that Dursunov failed to 
present a prima facie case that his attorney was ineffective. 
The district court, after articulating the relevant legal standards, carefully 
addressed each of Dursunov's claims in its "Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post Conviction 
Petition," correctly explaining why each failed to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (R., pp.334-43.) During a hearing on summary disposition, the district court 
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reiterated its positions on the various claims alleged in Dursunov's petition, and found 
/ 
additional support for its conclusions in Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 254 P .3d 69 
(Ct. App. 2011). (See Tr., p.6, L.3- p.10, L.13.) Dursunov has failed to show error in 
the district court's application of the law to the facts alleged in his petition for post-
conviction relief. The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal the district court's 
analysis as set forth at pages 5-1 O of its well-reasoned notice of intent to dismiss, which 
is attached as "Appendix A." 
On appeal, Dursunov argues that "his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
ensure that any psychosexual evaluation that he participated in was confidential unless 
and until he decided to disclose it to the district court and the State." (Appellant's brief, 
p.11.) Dursunov appears to be conflating multiple claims from his petition for post-
conviction relief to arrive at this novel argument (see R., pp.4-8), which still fails to 
establish deficient performance. Dursunov pied guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct, a 
crime for which a court may order a psychosexual evaluation. I.C. § 18-8316. The 
psychosexual evaluation of which Dursunov complains was ordered by the district court. 
(See Order for Psychosexual Evaluation (Court's Exhibit 1 ).) Dursunov has failed to 
present any authority that an attorney is required, much less able, to prevent a court-
ordered psychosexual evaluation in which a defendant voluntarily participates from 
being disclosed to the district court. Consequently, this argument is waived. See State 
v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments not supported by 
citations to authority are waived). Defendants do have a right under Estrada to not 
participate in court-ordered psychosexual evaluations, but the record clearly establishes 
that Dursunov's counsel made him aware of that right (See 6/9/2008 Tr., p.10, Ls.15-
8 
23 (Court's Exhibit 3).) Dursunov has failed to show deficient performance from any 
failure to prevent the court from receiving the evaluation it ordered. 
Relying on Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2009), 
Dursunov also argues on appeal that the district court was incorrect to hold that he had 
failed to show prejudice. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-14.) Hughes is not applicable to this 
case. In Hughes, the defendant claimed that his counsel was deficient, inter alia, for 
failing to inform him of his right to remain silent. Hughes, 148 Idaho at 462-63, 224 P.3d 
at 529-30. Thus, the defendant's prejudice argument relied on the inference that, had 
he been properly informed, there would have been no psychosexual evaluation for the 
court to consider. Hughes is therefore inapposite to this case, where Dursunov was 
informed of his right to refuse to participate in the psychosexual evaluation, and then 
participated in that court-ordered exam. 
Even were Hughes applicable to this case, Dursunov has still failed to establish 
prejudice. In Hughes, the Court concluded that three factors make up the prejudice 
determination in the context of psychosexual evaluations. 
The first factor is whether the content of the PSE itself is materially 
unfavorable.... If the PSE is not materially unfavorable, then the second 
prong of the Strickland standard has not been met. If the PSE is 
materially unfavorable to the applicant, the level of its negativity will then 
be weighed with two additional factors. The second factor is the extent of 
the sentencing court's reliance on the PSE if it can be demonstrated from 
the record. The third factor is the totality of the evidence before the 
sentencing court . 
.lit, at 464, 224 P.3d at 531. This three factor test, taken together, requires the 
petitioner to show "that there is a reasonable probability that the PSE resulted in a 
greater sentence." .lit, at 465, 224 P.3d at 531. 
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Dursunov asserts that the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation was materially 
unfavorable. (Appellant's brief, p.12.) Even assuming unfavorability, Dursunov still 
failed to show that the district court extensively relied on the psychosexual evaluation. 
In fact, the record affirmatively disproves that the sentencing judge based its sentence 
primarily on the psychosexual evaluation. In its order denying Dursunov's Rule 35 
motion, the sentencing judge explained, "there is nothing in Dr. Horton's evaluation or 
the polygraph which, if disregarded, would change the court's view [on the sentence 
imposed]." (R., p.119.) While the court had referenced the psychosexual evaluation at 
sentencing, its primary focus was on Dursunov's lack of remorse and deflecting blame 
for ~1is conduct onto his child victim. (Id.) The court noted: 
While Horton's report references this fact, the report is not the sole source 
of such information. The letters from Dursunov's family and the court's 
conclusion that the family received its information from Dursunov himself 
provided ample evidence of Dursunov's lack of remorse and therefore, his 
lack of amenability to treatment. 
(R., pp.119-20.) 
Dursunov failed to present a prima facie case that his attorney was deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. Dursunov therefore failed to establish 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court properly dismissed 
Dursunov's petition for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4906, and its order 
summarily dismissing the petition should be affirmed. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Dursunov's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 7th day of March, 2012. 
L J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of March, 2012, served a true and 
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SPENCERJ.HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
RJS/pm 
RUSSELLJ.SPENCER 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
POST CONVICTION PETITION 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner lldar Dursunov ("Dursunov") pied guilty to the charge of Lewd Conduct 
with a minor and was sentenced to a unified sentence of twenty years (six fixed, 
fourteen indeterminate) on October 20, 2008 by the Honorable Richard Bevan. He 
subsequently filed a Rule 35 Motion which was denied. Dursunov appealed his case 
and the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed on March 17, 2010 affirmed the 
sentence and the denial of his Rule 35 Motion. He timely flied his petition for post 
conviction relief on February 2, 2011 raising numerous issues concerning the 
performance of his attorney Dan Brown ("Brown"). He seeks to have his sentence 
modified to a unified sentence of 10 years, 2 years fixed, 8 years indeterminate. 1 
1 Preliminarily the Court notes that it is without authority to grant this request even if Dursunov were to 
prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. At most the Court could grant Dursunov a new 
sentencing. The Court will assume that this is what the petitioner requests in this case. 




An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, 
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 
Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 
724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must 
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 
2002). "An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary 
civil action[.]" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (quoting 
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628)). The application must contain much more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008); 
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The application must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records 
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. 
In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under LR.C.P. 56. "A claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary 
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dismissal ... if the applicant has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as 
to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of 
proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quoting 
Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998)). Thus, summary 
dismissal is permissible when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of 
material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 
P.3d at 629. Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be 
appropriate, however, even where the State does not controvert the applicant's 
evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
When considering dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, the Court must determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with any affidavits 
on file. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 
Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). However, "while the underlying 
facts must be regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted." 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069 (quoting Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 
407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985)); see also Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 
712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). As the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST CONVICTION PETITION - 3 
000336 
• 
the event of an evidentiary hearing, summary dismissal is appropriate where the 
evidentiary facts are not disputed, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be 
drawn from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict 
between those inferences. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Hayes, 146 
Idaho at 355, 195 P .3d at 714. That is, the judge in a post-conviction action is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 
P .2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that 
the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 
1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). It is presumed that trial counsel 
was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy. State v. 
Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1988) 
RECORD BEFORE THE COURT 
Dursunov appends to his petition a transcript of his October 20, 2008 sentencing 
hearing, a transcript of his April 6, 2009 Rule 35 hearing and a copy of the 
aforementioned Court of Appeals decision affirming his sentence. This Court's pre-trial 
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procedural order directed that any amendments to the petition must be filed within 28 
days of February 2, 2011. Petitioner has not sought to amend his petition. However, he 
has requested the Court take judicial notice of numerous documents filed in the 
underlying criminal case, including the PSI and Dr. Horton's psychosexual evaluation, 
Judge Bevan's Memorandum Decision denying Rule 35 relief, and affidavits of 
Dursanov's counsel Brown filed in support of that motion. The State's Answer 
contesting the petition was filed on March 14, 2011. The Court will take judicial notice 
of all of these documents, including those attached to the petition. In addition the Court, 
on its own motion, takes judicial notice of three other items from the underlying criminal 
file: the Guilty Plea Advisory Form filed June 9, 2008, the Court's Order for 
Psychosexual Evaluation, and a transcript of the Change of Plea hearing held on June 
9, 2008. I.RE. 201. These latter documents are marked as Court's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 
respectively for purposes of this file. The facts of this case will be discussed as they 
relate to each of Dursanov's claims. 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS 
Dursunov is given notice of the reasons for the proposed dismissal of his petition 
as follows. 
1. Claimed Estrada Violation. 
Dursunov asserts: "Mr. Brown did not inform me of my right to continued silence 
under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 158, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)." This factual assertion is 
clearly contradicted by the record in this case. At the plea hearing Judge Bevan advised 
Dursunov that the Court would order a PSI and a Psychosexual Evaluation. The Court 
specifically asked Dursunov through the interpreter: "And has Mr. Brown talked to you 
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about you right to remain silent and not speak to an evaluator or to assist in the PSI 
process." He responded "Yes." His confirmation shows compliance with the Estrada rule 
and forms no basis for post-conviction relief. 
2. Failure to obtain confidential psvchosexual evaluation prior to advising to 
enter a plea of guilty. 
Dursunov asserts that Brown should have obtained a confidential psychosexual 
evaluation prior to advising him to enter a plea of guilty. Implicit in this assertion is that 
such an evaluation would have either been very beneficial to Dursunov or conversely 
that it would have been very detrimental. The plea in this case was not entered pursuant 
to a sentencing plea bargain. The Court is not aware of any law that requires defense 
counsel to obtain psychosexual evaluations prior to advising defendants to enter a plea 
in a sex case. Nor is the Court aware of any standards applicable in these types of 
cases that recommend that counsel obtain such evaluations. It was clear that this was 
an "open recommendation" plea bargain. If Dursunov had obtained such an evaluation 
for use in the plea bargaining process and had it been "detrimental" surely counsel 
would not have disclosed that to the State. If he had, surely it would not have resulted in 
a favorable recommendation from the State. If the evaluation had been "favorable" the 
Court finds that it would have made little difference in this case. The Court ordered 
evaluation recommended the "rider" program. The ''favorable" recommendation of Mr. 
Ater presented at the Rule 35 hearing recommended "probation." Judge Bevan rejected 
both recommendations and imposed a penitentiary sentence primarily due to the 
seriousness of this offense and Dursanov's lack of acceptance of responsibility. The 
decision to obtain or not obtain such an evaluation prior to advising a defendant to enter 
a guilty plea is clearly a strategy decision and does not under the facts of this case 
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constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Assuming arguendo that it does, the Court 
finds no prejudice to Dursunov. The State had a prosecutable case. Dursunov has 
made no showing that a ''favorable" evaluation would have deterred the State from 
insisting on a plea of guilty regardless of the recommendations of an evaluator. 
Similarly, he has made no showing that such an evaluation would have in any way 
affected the sentence ultimately imposed. Moreover. Dursunov stated at the time of his 
plea that there was not anything that he asked his attorney to do that was not done. The 
written guilty plea advisory form (Question 51) confirmed that he was satisfied with his 
attorney's representation. The Court finds there is no merit to this portion of Dursanov's 
claim. 
3. Turnover of Report without knowing results thereof. 
Dursunov asserts that "Mr. Brown agreed to turn over the results of the court-
ordered psychosexual evaluation without knowing what the results would be" citing 
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). In Wood the defendant requested Court 
appointment of a psychiatrist. Upon pleading guilty, the Court, without objection from 
Wood's counsel, ordered that the psychiatrist's report, the contents of which were 
unknown to the defendant, be included in the PSI. The psychiatrist testified at 
sentencing at the request of the State unfavorably to Wood. The Supreme Court found 
Wood's counsel's actions in failing to object to the Court's order to include the 
psychiatric exam in the PSI to constitute ineffective assistance which was prejudicial to 
Wood. Wood does not provide authority for what occurred in this case. The sentencing 
court is vested with the discretion to order a psychosexual evaluation in cases involving 
lewd conduct with a minor. I.C. §18-8316. If ordered the defendant shall submit to such 
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an evaluation, subject of course to the protections articulated in Estrada. Once ordered, 
the evaluation must be submitted to the Court. Had Mr. Brown objected to "turning over" 
the results of the evaluation, his objection would have been futile. Certainly he could 
have objected to the contents of the evaluation. To the extent he did based upon the 
"language" issue, which has been addressed on appeal and does not afford Dursunov a 
basis for post-conviction relief. The Court finds no merit to this claim. 
4. Failure to inform defendant that he could have his own confidential 
psychosexual evaluation. 
Dursunov asserts: "Mr. Brown did not inform me that I could have my own 
confidential psychosexual evaluation." This is an undisputed factual assertion in the 
record. For many of the reasons set forth above, again assuming arguendo that this 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, Dursunov has failed to establish how this 
prejudiced him in this case. He does state that had he been so informed he would have 
obtained such an evaluation. He does not state that he would not have plead guilty. Nor 
does he offer any evidence of what such an evaluation would have established. It 
appears that the "confidential evaluation" that he would have sought would have come 
from Gail Ater. To that extent, the results of Mr. Ater's limited evaluation were presented 
at the Rule 35 hearing. The only significant distinction between the two evaluations was 
the evaluator's conclusion as to the degree of risk of re-offense: moderate to high from 
Dr. Horton; moderate to low from Mr. Ater. It is clear from the sentencing record that 
Judge Bevan, while recognizing that Dr. Horton's evaluation was somewhat 
unfavorable, sentenced Dursunov to the penitentiary for reasons beyond consideration 
of his amenability for treatment. Dursunov has failed to establish entitlement to post-
conviction relief for this claim. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST CONVICTION PETITION - 8 
000341 
• -
5. Confidentiality of Dr. Horton's report. 
Dursunov seems to claim that he was entitled to have a confidential evaluation 
from Dr. Horton. If that is his claim, it is without merit. The Court ordered the evaluation. 
As such, it is not confidential. Dursunov had no right to claim confidentiality of a court 
ordered evaluation. Nor did he have the right to preclude the Court from considering its 
own court ordered evaluation. Mr. Brown would not have prevailed on such an objection 
even if he had made it. This claim does not entitle Dursunov to post conviction relief. 
6. Failure to object to Dr. Horton's evaluation. 
The record before this Court does support Dursanov's assertion that Mr. Brown 
did not object to Dr. Horton's evaluation. Judge Bevan addressed all of the issues 
concerning the "language" issue in his Memorandum Opinion Denying Rule 35 relief 
and as stated this decision was affirmed on appeal. In that opinion the Court stated: 
"Nevertheless, even if the court were to consider Dursanov's changed position now, 
after sentence was pronounced, there is nothing in in Dr. Horton's evaluation or the 
polygraph which, if disregarded would change this court's view. This Court did reference 
Horton's evaluation, and perhaps the polygraph, during its sentencing colloquy. 
However, the court's primary focus was that Dursunov lacked remorse for his crime and 
was otherwise deflecting blame for his own conduct onto the child victim. While Horton's 
report references this fact, the report is not the sole source of such information." 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying /.C.R. 35 Motion, pgs. 6-7. Had Mr. Brown 
made more specific objections to the "language" issue as it concerned the report and 
the polygraph, given Judge Bevan's statement quoted above, it is clear to this Court that 
there is not "a reasonable probability that the Court would have imposed a lesser 
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sentence if Mr. Brown had objected to Dr. Horton's report and the polygraph results at 
the sentencing hearing" as Dursunov alleges. Dursunov has not established the 
prejudice prong of Strickland that would entitle him to post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court believes that it has addressed all of Dursanov's claims in this Notice. If 
it has not, then Dursunov is notified that he must more fully articulate his claims or his 
petition will be dismissed. The Court hereby gives notice of intent to dismiss this petition 
for the reasons set forth above with prejudice 20 days from the date hereof unless 
Dursunov presents materials to the Court which would cause reconsideration of the 
Court's intent to dismiss. 
Randy J. Sta r 
District Judge 
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